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I. Introduction
The 2010 symposium of the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation recently invited a
group of eminent scholars and practitioners to Chapel Hill to
discuss the future of law and development under the Obama
administration. The aim of this brief introduction is to orient
readers who might not be familiar with recent currents in law and
development and to give some context for the articles that follow.
As I begin writing these remarks, President Barack Obama has
been in office for just over one year.' For scholars and citizens
who focus on the plight of the world's poor countries, and for the
even narrower swath of people who view international
development through the lens of the law, there has been relatively
little action by the administration on those fronts thus far. The
administration has dedicated most of its energy to extricating the
country from a severe financial crisis, managing two inherited
wars, and repairing the United States' dysfunctional healthcare
f"Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill School of Law.
J.D., 1991, Northeastern University School of Law; A.B., 1984, Harvard University.
1 See Carl Hulse, Obama Is Sworn In as the 44th President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2009, at Al.
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system. Still, the young administration has provided some clues
regarding its attitude and its approach toward international law and
development.
One thing seems evident: The administration believes that
healthy institutions are vital to the future of the developing world.2
President Obama's speech in Accra, Ghana on July 11, 2009
mentioned institutions five separate times, including the quotable
admonition that "Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong
institutions."3 According to the President, "[i]n the 21st century,
capable, reliable and transparent institutions are the key to
success."' When the President specified the institutions to which
he was referring, there was a distinct legal tint, including
parliaments, police forces, and judiciaries.5
A survey of U.S.-funded international aid programs seems to
indicate that the focus on institution building is more than mere
rhetoric. Many U.S.-funded programs aim to build rational,
predictable institutions, with a particular emphasis on putting
institutions in place that will stimulate commercial development in
6poor countries. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a
relatively new and increasingly important U.S. aid organization,7
2 Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the
President to the Ghanaian Parliament (July 11, 2009) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-Ghanaian-Parliament.
3 Id. 25.
4 Id. 22.
5 Id. Similarly, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton mentioned institutions in a
major address at the 8th Forum of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, stating that
"[c]itizens and governments need to work together to build and sustain strong democratic
institutions." See Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks at the 8th
Forum of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, at 34 (Aug. 5, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/08/126902.htm).
6 See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., LAND AND BUSINESS FORMALIZATION FOR
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR: STRATEGIC OVERVIEW PAPER 7 (Jan. 2, 2007),
available at
http://www.ardinc.com/upload/photos/677Land-andBusiness-FornalizationStrategic_
Overview Paper FINALwith Annexes.pdf [hereinafter USAID Land and Business
Formalization Report] (citing Douglass North, the seminal New Institutional Economics
scholar, as the inspiration for USAID's development strategy); see also Jefferey
Gettleman, Kenya's Volatile Politics Shadow Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, at A8
(quoting U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as stating that the new U.S. approach to
aid to Africa would include the goal of "bolstering support for African entrepreneurs").
7 Doug Johnson & Tristan Zajonc, Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentive for Good
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along with the more venerable United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), are initiating programs in
poor countries around the world based on the assumption that the
future stability and prosperity of these countries depend upon
unleashing and guiding the entrepreneurial spirit of small- and
medium-sized enterprises,8 and that this can be accomplished by
improving the institutions-most notably the laws and legal
enforcement mechanisms-that regulate them.9 The new wave of
aid programs aims to remove ineffective, burdensome, and
bureaucratic institutions laden with red tape and to introduce
streamlined, consistent, business-facilitative institutions that will
lend support and structure to poor countries' business sectors.°
The idea of alleviating the plight of poor countries by helping
them develop strong, rational, highly functioning institutions is not
new. That notion has been implicit in various rubrics that have, at
least temporarily, dominated international law and development
discourse in recent decades, particularly the rubrics of rule of law
and democracy and governance. But designating institution
building as the keystone of law and development and, indeed, of
all international development, is a novel trend.
II. Looking Backward: The Washington Consensus Gives
Way to New Institutionalism
A. The Washington Consensus
When I began paying close attention to international law and
development fifteen years ago, the aid discourse was grounded
firmly in the Washington Consensus. The Consensus spawned a
vast literature promoting it, justifying it, critiquing it, and
Governance? Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (Apr. 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/grad-student/0l1.pdf
(referring to the creation of the MCC as the most significant shift in U.S. foreign aid
policy since the creation of USAID in 1961).
8 See generally USAID Land and Business Formalization Report, supra note 6, at
2 (noting that elements in robust formalization programs include improved opportunities
designed to assist small and newly-formed operations).
9 See id. at 7.
10 See, e.g., Mary M. Shirley, Institutions and Development, in HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 611 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005)
(attributing underdevelopment in the Third World to weak, missing, or perverse
institutions).
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ultimately trying to account for its failure. I will devote one brief
paragraph to it, with apologies to all those who experienced it in
all of its complexity.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Western nations and
the aid agencies they controlled interpreted their Cold War victory
as an unambiguous repudiation of government regulation and
proof of the value of unregulated free markets." They tailored
their international development strategies to this view and more or
less imposed their deregulation philosophy on poor countries
through ex ante "conditionalities" that were written into aid
agreements. 12  In essence, the poor countries received the
development assistance they desperately needed only on the
condition that they agreed to adopt what became a standard
package of liberal economic, legal, and political reforms that
emphasized democratization through elections; balancing budgets;
the shrinking of the state; the deregulation and privatization of the
economy; and the removal of perceived barriers to free trade. 3
That standard reform package became known as the Washington
Consensus, and it dominated international development for most
of the 1990s.
B. The New Institutionalism
By the dawn of the new millennium, the Consensus had caused
a good deal of suffering and political turmoil in the developing
world and had shown little in the way of positive economic results.
Explanations varied, 4 but a new consensus began to take shape,
this one agreeing that radical liberalization and deregulation were
not necessarily the keys to development in the Third World, and
that rational, efficient institutions, especially governmental
institutions, were in fact vital for maintaining a healthy economy
I I See Edmund Amann, Introduction to REGULATING DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE
FROM AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA 1-2 (Edmund Amann ed., 2006) (describing 1990s
development policy as focusing on privatization and market deregulation).
12 Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 7, at 2 (referring to ex ante conditionalities).
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., Hossein Jalilian et al., Creating the Conditions for International
Business Expansion: The Impact of Regulation on Economic Growth in Developing
Countries - A Cross-Country Analysis, in REGULATING DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM
AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA, supra note 11, at 12 (referring to arguments that
privatization failed due to political mismanagement and corruption).
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and by extension, a healthy nation.15 Consequently, the task of
guiding poor countries toward more prosperous and stable futures
shifted from disassembling their regulatory institutions to
improving the quality of those institutions. 6
This New Institutionalism has deep theoretical roots in the
discipline of economics. Explaining the theory in a few
paragraphs is a daunting task, particularly for one not inclined
toward economics. Once again, therefore, I begin with an apology
for an exercise in vast oversimplification.
As is true of many discussions of Western economic theories,
this one begins with Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, which
taught that governmental regulation and central planning were not
necessary to bring order to economic systems because the
"Invisible Hand" of supply and demand and competitive pricing
would always accomplish the task more effectively.17 In the
1960s, renowned economist Ronald Coase generated two
important insights that added nuance to Adam Smith's Invisible
Hand theory and had a formative influence on today's focus on
institution building. 18  Coase argued that Adam Smith's
intellectual heirs-with their laser-like focus on pricing as a
regulatory mechanism and their unshakeable assumption that the
world was inhabited by atomized utility-maximizers-ignored the
fact that firms play a vital role in creating economic efficiency. 19
Coase believed there were costs associated with relying on the
pricing mechanism.2" For example, the individual participant in
the market had to investigate and negotiate prices, and once those
prices were determined, had to enforce them by entering into
contracts. 2' When those contracts failed, the individual was forced
15 See id. at 12-13 (describing the development consensus that institutions matter).
16 See id.
17 See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 31, 31-32 (Claude M6nard & Mary
M. Shirley eds., 2008). See also ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Penguin
Books 1997) (1776).
18 KOFI OTENG KUFOUR, THE INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES 2-3 (2006) (arguing Coase's novel
ideas were at the root of New Institutional Economics).
19 Id. at 3.
20 Coase, supra note 17, at 34 (discussing Coase's own initial realization of these
costs in 1932).
21 Id.
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to seek the intervention of courts and other dispute resolution
mechanisms.2 All of these necessary steps to participation in the
market created what Coase termed "transaction costs."23 In his
view, firms naturally form as a means of reducing transaction
costs and creating greater efficiency.4
Coase also argued that physical things are not traded on the
open market; rather, it is the right to perform actions in relation to
those physical things that is traded.25 He believed that the
contours of those rights were determined by a given society's legal
system and, logically therefore, that a society's legal system had a
profound effect on its economy.26 He asserted that, as a matter of
sound economic policy, legal systems should operate in such a
way that rights could be assigned to those market actors who
would use them most productively and efficiently.27 Stated
otherwise, an economically efficient society's legal system should
ensure that the costs of transferring economic rights are low so
that they can be expeditiously transferred to their most efficient
users. The upshot, according to Coase and his followers, is that
laws, particularly those governing the negotiation and enforcement
of contracts and the protection of property rights resulting from
such contracts, were to be clear, simple and strong. 8
Building upon Coase's insights about the importance of firms
and transaction costs, the work of the American economist,
Douglass North, highlighted the vital role that institutions play in
efficiently regulating economies. North defined institutions
broadly as "humanly devised constraints that structure human
interactions,, 29 including both the legal systems that Coase thought
were so vital as well as less formal, non-governmental social
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. ("It was the avoidance of the costs of carrying out transactions through the
market that could explain the existence of the firm in which the allocation of factors
came about as a result of administrative decisions.").
25 Id. at 37.
26 Coase, supra note 17, at 37.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
359, 360 (1994).
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networks and norms.3°  Together, the formal and informal
institutions define the "rules of the game" for the economy and the
"way the game is played."'31
In the oversimplified version of North's work that often
appears in action plans and project reports drafted by international
aid organizations, good institutions, most particularly good laws
and legal enforcement mechanisms that facilitate contracts and
protect property rights, lead to strong economies. Weak
institutions, most notably laws, regulatory bodies and law
enforcement mechanisms that are confusing, laden with red tape,
and corrupt, lead to weak economies. The key to successful
economic transformation, and ultimately to socio-economic
development, is therefore to replace bad institutions with good
ones.
When international aid agencies apply North's institutional
theories, they tend to ignore the fact that his writings consistently
emphasize the arduous, incremental nature of institutional
change.32 He writes that individuals and organizations invariably
exist within an institutional matrix, the logic of which is
determined by the society's history and the norms that have
evolved, and on the experiences and belief systems of the
individuals who make up the society.33 The interwoven nature of
the society's institutional matrix creates a path dependency that
largely determines the shape that future institutions will take, from
which it is extremely difficult to break free.34 Most policy
interventions aimed at a society's institutions focus only on a
given society's formal laws and regulations, and are often
ineffective due to path dependency and because so many of a
given society's institutions are informal rather than formal.35
The focus of Coase, North, and their intellectual descendants
on the importance of consistent property rights and the necessity
of institutional reform was echoed and amplified by Peruvian
30 Douglass C. North, Institutions and the Performance of Economies Over Time,
in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 10, at 22.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 24.
33 Id. at 23-24.
34 Id.
35 See id. at 27-28 (expressing disdain for simplistic development nostrums that
seek to abruptly change developing countries' institutional frameworks).
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social scientist Hernando de Soto, who, perhaps to an even greater
extent than Coase and North, has become the guiding intellectual
light of the new wave of institutionalists.36 According to De Soto,
poor countries can rise with the economic tide of globalization and
grow their way out of poverty if and only if they reform their
regulatory institutions to either eliminate or at least reduce the
unnecessary red tape that creates insuperable "barriers to entry"
for would-be entrepreneurs.37  Those entrepreneurs,
understandably daunted by unnecessarily complex regulatory and
legal requirements, simply avoid the mess (described by Coase
and North as "transaction costs") by conducting their businesses
underground in the informal sector.38 This in turn has a deleterious
effect, not only on the entrepreneurs' prospects for economic
growth, but on the country's overall economy.39
Since the entrepreneur chooses to operate in the informal
sector, he has no secure rights or title to his own assets and
therefore cannot convert those assets into productive capital.' He
cannot pledge his business or his office building as collateral for a
loan in order to expand because, in the eyes of the law and
necessarily in the eyes of the institutional lender, his business does
not exist.41 Without a formal legal existence, and in the broader
context of an unpredictable and inconsistent institutional
framework, intensification of investment by the entrepreneur or
any capital investment by outside sources is unacceptably risky.42
Consistent with the theories of Coase and North, De Soto's
solution to the problem is to establish better institutions,
particularly those that rationalize and protect private property,
allowing property owners to revive their "dead" capital and
36 See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (Basic Books 2003); see also THE
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR
MARKETS 34-38 (2001), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServeriW3P/IB/2001/1 0/05/00009494
6_01092204010636?rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (citing De Soto regarding the
importance of secure property rights and formal land titles).
37 DE SOTO, supra note 36, at 30.
38 Id. at 21.
39 Id. at 21, 28.
40 Id. at 40, 51-54.
41 Id. at 51-54.
42 ld. at 51-54, 56.
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generate surplus value from their assets.43
C. Putting Institutional Theory into Practice
Translating these scholars' writings into concrete policy
initiatives fell in part to another prominent American economist,
Jeffery Sachs, who spearheaded an effort to bring the insights of
New Institutionalism, along with the general empirical rigor of
economics, to international development work.' Sachs took a
leading role in orienting both the U.S. government and the United
Nations toward what became known as the Millennium
Development Goals-specific poverty reduction and development
goals that donor countries, along with their partners in the
developing world, would commit to achieving. In 2004, the
United States created a new agency, the MCC, to tackle its
Millennium Development commitments. 45  Because the MCC is
the U.S. government's primary organ for carrying out the new
institution-focused development policy, we turn our attention
there.
The MCC delivers U.S. development assistance to countries
that demonstrate that they have good institutions, or are at least on
the path toward developing them.46 In an attempt to avoid past
instances where poor countries promised to undertake reforms but
then failed to follow through, the MCC has adopted an ex ante
development strategy; that is, the MCC will not turn over funding
until the developing countries have already demonstrated progress
in institution-building, and will not continue to invest in countries
unless they show ongoing progress.47
The MCC's incentive program is based upon a two-tier system
of engagement. Developing countries that are heading in the right
43 DE SoTo, supra note 36, at 54-55; THE WORLD BANK, DOING BusINESS IN 2005:
REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH 3 (2005), available at
http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/DoingBusiness/DB-2005-Overview.pdf.
44 See generally JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES
FOR OUR TIME (Penguin Press 2005). Sachs advocated "shock therapy," also referred to
as "big bang" reform, for developing countries, as opposed to the view of North, who, as
noted earlier, characterized institutional change as a slow, iterative process.
45 Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 7, at 1 (referring to the 2004 founding of the MCC
as perhaps the most significant shift in U.S. foreign aid policy since President Kennedy
created USAID in 1961).
46 See id. at 4 (employing the terminology "sound policy environments").
47 Id. at 5.
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direction on institutional and policy reform, but that have not yet
achieved sufficient scores on the MCC's quantitative indicators
(described below), may be offered comparatively modest, short-
term assistance in the form of a so-called Threshold Program.48
The Threshold countries receive a cash infusion and a period of
time to improve their scores and earn full engagement by the
MCC. Full engagement comes in the form of an MCC compact, a
written agreement in which a package of institutional and policy
reforms is proposed by the recipient nation.49 The reforms can, in
theory, provide tens of millions of dollars in development support
over a period of several years.5"
In keeping with the quantitative nature of the MCC's
economic philosophy, progress on institution-building is measured
empirically rather than by the mere qualitative intuition of policy-
makers and aid experts.51 In the confident and optimistic words of
a recent World Bank report, "what gets measured gets done."52
The MCC has energetically addressed the challenge of finding
meaningful quantitative measurements of institutional progress in
poor countries by developing seventeen so-called "MCC
indicators" that rely on empirical data collected from various
existing sources to measure good governance and institutional
soundness.53 The indicators are broken up into three distinct
themes or categories: Encouraging Economic Freedom, Ruling
Justly, and Investing in People.54
48 Id. at 6.
49 Id. at 5. In theory, the poor countries are supposed to design their own
programs. In fact, the process is directed by Americans from the start. The countries use
aid money to hire American consultants, who, in close communication with the
American Embassy in the country and the USAID or MCC staff, craft the application to
meet the expectations of the United States.
50 See id. at 6 (noting that the first two MCC compacts included a combined $34
million in development assistance).
51 Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 7, at 6.
52 THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2010: REFORMING THROUGH DIFFICULT
TIMES 3 (2010), http://www.doingbusiness.org/features/Highlights20l0.aspx (follow
"Download the full report" hyperlink).
53 Millennium Challenge Corporation, Guide to the MCC Indicators and the
Selection Process 2 (2008) [hereinafter MCC Guide to Indicators], 3-4, available at
http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/bm.doc/mcc-2010-guide-to-the-indicators-2.pdf; see also
Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 7, at 6 (citing sixteen indicators, as compared to the
seventeen listed in the MCC Guide to Indicators).
54 Id.
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The MCC gathers the empirical data described above, along
with quantitative information on thirteen other topics as diverse as
immunization rates, girls' primary education, and natural resource
management, and as vague as "government effectiveness."
Analysts then plug the data into a formula and summarize it on
easy-to-read charts. Active and aspiring participants in MCC
Threshold Programs and Compacts are supposed to vie with one
another in what is essentially a horse race to see which performer
makes the most progress on the various indicators. Only the best
performers will continue to receive financial support.55
As discussed in the introduction to this article, early
indications show that the Obama administration will continue to
focus on institution building as the fulcrum of its international law
and development policy, and that it will continue to measure the
health of Third World institutions with reference to the
Millennium Challenge goals.
D. Dissenting Voices
The building of efficacious institutions has become a central
tenet of Western-in particular the United States'-aid policy in
recent years, but not all commentators accept the notion. Some
skeptics point out that although scholars-economists in
particular-have carried out many empirical studies over the last
decade, there is little evidence that the institutional package
promoted by the United States and the Bretton Woods
organizations do in fact lead to economic growth.56 The many
empirical studies of this proposition have come to contradictory
conclusions. The world around us, with China as the prime
example, demonstrates quite dramatically that economic success
does not hinge on Western-style institutions that uphold the
55 Id.
56 See Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 7, at 4; USAID Land and Business
Formalization Report, supra note 6, at 119-27 Annex 6 (Jan. 2, 2007) (summarizing
results of multiple empirical studies, some concluding that improved institutions lead to
economic growth, others concluding they do not); see also CURTIS J. MILHAUPT &
KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT
LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD, (Univ. of Chicago
Press 2008) (concluding that there is no meaningful relationship between economic
growth and the purely formal attributes of a country's legal system, regardless of
whether its origins are in a civil law or common law system).
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sanctity of contract, property rights, and the rule of law.57
A second empirical critique does not necessarily dispute that
good institutions will lead to economic growth, but questions the
more specific claim put forward by Hernando de Soto's work: Bad
institutions in the form of red tape, bureaucratic rent-seeking, and
costs, create the primary "barriers to entry" that persuade
businesses to remain in the informal sector."8 Studies have found a
weak causal connection between bureaucratic red tape and
informality, and suggest other reasons for entrepreneurs' decisions
to keep their businesses informal.5 9
In addition to these empirical critiques, recent scholarship has
challenged the new institutionalist approach to Third World
development on more normative grounds, arguing that it
oversimplifies complex social and political realities by treating
law as if it were a politically neutral technology, a fixed
endowment that can be transplanted and left behind in a
developing country like a road or a hydroelectric dam.6' This law-
as-technology approach ignores the reality that law is always
produced by and embedded within a political economy that has
winners and losers.61 All legal systems must balance conflicting
interests, not only at the initial allocation of citizens' rights but
whenever such rights conflict with the rights of others.62 Such
reallocation of rights involves value judgments and political
bargains that affect the distribution of wealth and the society's
conception of what is just.63  Invariably, institutions--especially
legal institutions-introduced as mere technology from the outside
57 Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 7, at 19. See also MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note
56, at 209.
58 See, e.g., Michael A. McPherson & Carl Liedholm, Determinants of Small Micro
Enterprise Registration: Results from Surveys in Niger and Swaziland, 24 WORLD DEV.
481, 485-86 (1996) (concluding that heavy bureaucratic requirements do not have a
significant effect on entrepreneurs' decisions whether or not to register their businesses).
59 Id. at 483-84.
60 MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 56, at 20.
61 See generally Giorgio Blundo & Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, Why Should We
Study Everyday Corruption and How Should We Go About It?, in EVERYDAY
CORRUPTION AND THE STATE: CITIZENS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN AFRICA 6 (Susan Cox
trans., David Philip 2006) (2006) (arguing that the rule of law-as-technology, stripped
from political considerations, is ignorant of context in the subject country).
62 MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 56, at 31.
63 Id.
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ignore the existing political economy of the subject country and
are either rejected by the people or used by elites to solidify their
positions, often in ways that are manifestly unjust. 4
Two theories attempt to explain why law and development
experts have put forward this sterilized, essentially technological
view of law and law reform. One can be described by the adage
that "if you are a hammer, every problem looks like a nail." That
is, if you are an economist, as it seems most development experts
these days are, notions such as justice and the distribution of
political power are hard to measure, squeeze into regression
analyses, and plot on charts. Therefore, you ignore, or at least
marginalize, such important considerations.65 A slightly more
cynical version of this explanation points out that the international
financial organizations such as the World Bank and the 1MF that
have taken the lead in implementing the law-as-technology
approach are forbidden by their charters from straying into the
realm of politics, whereas nothing prevents them from being
involved in technology transfer.66  They therefore adopt,
consciously or unconsciously, strained definitions of law that
permit them to take what they view as appropriate action.67
III. The Obama Administration and Beyond: The Future of
International Law and Development
The remaining question is where international law and
development is headed in the near and intermediate future. Will
we continue to focus on institution building and scientific
measurement of outputs, or will a new paradigm emerge? The
quick answer is that I do not know, and that this was the question
the symposium hoped to address. This brief conclusion can,
however, point to some of the possibilities.
64 See UGO MATEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL 3, 7
(Wiley-Blackwell 2008) (arguing that current aid policy too often focuses on efficiency
and competition to the exclusion of social justice, which tends to favor local elites over
the poor).
65 See id. at 49, 94 (stating that economists find ideology intellectually
uninteresting and that they consider obsolete any argument that cannot be understood
and described in graphs and numbers); see generally NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS:
THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THEIR BORROWERS (Cornell Univ. Press 2006)
(examining the role of the IMF and the World Bank in international relations).
66 MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 56, at 20-21.
67 Id.
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Among academic commentators, there has been a recent
chorus of critiques arguing that future international law and
development programs should focus more intently on adapting
their interventions to the cultures of subject countries.6" I mention
this group first, not because it predominates, but because I count
myself as part of it. Those cultural critiques have, in turn,
spawned a backlash of literature arguing that the focus on culture
is misplaced. Amy Cohen from The Ohio State Moritz College of
Law, who participated in the symposium, can be counted among
those voices.69
Another suggestion for future law and development work is
that it be targeted at sub-national actors in developing countries,
avoiding as much as possible the top-heavy, unwieldy, and often
corrupt aid infrastructure that inevitably develops when law and
development (and indeed, all development) programs are carried
on from government to government. Such is the view espoused by
the American economist William Easterly, whose curmudgeonly
skeptical books and articles have gained broad readership in recent
years.70 This preference for smaller-scale interventions with sub-
national actors such as local governments was echoed by Ronald
Johnson and Dan Goetz, law and development practitioners from
RTI International who participated in the symposium.7'
Two other symposium participants, in contrast, focused on the
future importance of supra-national law and development
68 See generally Thomas Kelley, Unintended Consequences of Legal
Westernization in Niger: Harming Contemporary Slaves by Reconceptualizing Property,
56 AM. J. COMP. LAW 999 (2008) (describing the unintended negative consequences that
result when law reform fails to account for local culture in developing countries);
Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy, The Legal Empowerment Alternative 25
(Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 41, 2003) (criticizing recent
law and development efforts for failing to understand on the ground conditions in subject
countries); JAMES A. GARNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN
AID IN LATIN AMERICA 8-9 (Univ. of Wisconsin Press 1981) (emphasizing the
importance of culture in establishing legal frameworks in subject countries).
69 See generally Amy Cohen, Thinking with Culture in Law and Development, 57
BUFF. L. REV. 511 (2009).
70 See, e.g., WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S
EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND So LITTLE GOOD (Penguin
Books 2006) (calling for fundamental change in the West's approach to aid, including
vast reduction in wasteful, large-scale aid programs).
71 See generally RTI International; Governance and Economic Growth,
http://www.rti.org/page.cfm/InternationalDevelopment (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
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institutions. Claire Dickerson from the Tulane University School
of Law, the symposium's keynote speaker, described the benefits
of regional business codes, such as Organisation Pour
l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA) in
West Africa, that have the potential to spur economic
development by providing a consistent legal infrastructure while
limiting the role for involvement by sticky (that is, inefficient
and/or corrupt) state-level institutions.72 Somewhat similarly,
James Gathii from Albany Law School addressed the symposium
on the utility of regional free trade agreements in Africa.73 In
combination, the calls for a focus on sub-national institutions and
the separate calls for focus on supra-national institutions lead one
to wonder whether a possible path for the future of law in the
developing world is to create legal interventions that avoid states
as much as possible, and instead target the interventions at both
sub- and supra-national institutions.
The exercise in speculation regarding the future of law and
development would not be complete without at least mentioning
the increasingly popular view that the United States, other western
powers, and the financial institutions they dominate ought to
abandon altogether their efforts to spur development in poor
countries through economic and legal reform. According to this
view, their interventions consistently go awry, result in little if any
good, and tend to cause suffocating dependence and corruption
rather than economic growth. Among such aid pessimists,
Dambisa Moyo's voice is the most ubiquitous if not the most
eminent. 4
The 2010 symposium did not resolve the question of what
comes next in the realm of international law and development.
72 See, e.g., Claire Dickerson, The Cameroonian Experience under OHADA:
Business Organizations in a Developing Economy, 112 Bus. & Soc. REv. 191 (2007).
See also Claire Dickerson, The Future of International Law and Development: Flying
Under the Radar, 35 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 555 (2010).
73 See generally James Gathii, The High Stakes of WTO Reform, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1361 (2006) (discussing the importance of multilateral trade agreements for developing
countries). See also James Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal
Regimes, 35 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 571 (2010).
74 See generally DAMBISA MoYo, DEAD AID: WHY AID Is NOT WORKING AND How
THERE IS A BETrER WAY FORWARD FOR AFRICA (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2009)
(discussing how the flow of aid to Africa has created an aid-dependency that has stunted
economic and political growth).
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Those who participated, however, hope that the discussion might
in a small way help chart a course for the future.
